on Plan to Take Plutonium Out of Warheads
By Matthew L. WALD
New York Times, August 21, 2001
WASHINGTON, Aug. 20 - A program conceived by the Clinton administration
to rid the world of 100 tons of American and Russian weapons-grade plutonium
is likely to be abandoned by the Bush administration, according to people
who have been briefed about the project.
Under the plan, which was first proposed in the mid-90's, 50 tons
of American plutonium and 50 tons of Russian plutonium would be taken
out of nuclear weapons and either converted into fuel for nuclear reactors
or rendered useless for weapons by mixing it with with highly radioactive
nuclear waste, a process known as immobilization.
When the plan was drafted, Clinton administration officials said the
program would reduce the risk that the plutonium would fall into the
wrong hands, where it could easily be turned into weapons.
By reducing the availability of weapons-grade plutonium, the project
had the added benefit of bolstering treaties between the United States
and Russia to cut the number of nuclear warheads deployed by each side,
by making it harder to turn plutonium from decommissioned weapons back
Bush administration officials deny that the program is dead, but acknowledge
that it has difficulties, primarily financial ones.
"The issue is under review," said an administration official
who would speak only if not identified. "We've made no secret of
that. But no decisions have been made."
But the official continued, "It's no secret that there are a
lot of equities to balance here."
One major equity, he said, is money. Early this year the Energy Department
predicted a cost of $6.6 billion, about triple the initial estimates,
to convert the American stocks to fuel for civilian nuclear reactors.
It put Russia's cost at $1.76 billion, which is money Russia does not
The expectation under the Clinton administration was that the United
States and other rich countries would help pay, but no concrete pledges
were ever made.
In 1999 the Clinton administration did agree to pay a consortium of
power companies $130 million to use plutonium that the government would
convert into fuel. But the conversion factories are not yet built, and
the conversion itself was contingent on an agreement with the Russians
to take similar steps to dispose of plutonium from their weapons.
Despite the program's expected benefits, the Bush administration's
proposed Energy Department budget this spring did not include the money
needed to mix some of the plutonium with nuclear waste.
The second path - converting it to fuel for American nuclear reactors,
the strategy the Clinton administration hoped would induce the Russians
to do the same - also appears likely to be dropped soon.
"There is no enthusiasm for it whatsoever," said a Congressional
aide who was briefed by officials of the National Security Council,
referring both to the current strategy of immobilization and to conversion
to reactor fuel.
The issue of what to do with plutonium from decommissioned nuclear
weapons has haunted policy makers for years.
One particular fear is that the material from Russian weapons would
be bought or stolen by terrorists or a "rogue" government
who could construct a nuclear bomb. In recent years, the security of
bomb materials in Russia has been improved markedly by joint Russian-American
efforts, administration experts say.
Bush administration officials insist that they share the goal of disposing
of American and Russian plutonium.
"There's no philosphical shift that says suddenly we're perfectly
fine with surplus plutonium laying around - we're not," said an
administration official familiar with the Clinton-era program. But,
he added, conversion to fuel for existing reactors or mixing with waste
are "not the only options for disposing of it safely."
As an alternative, the Bush administration appears to be considering
a variety of untested technical options, including a new generation
of nuclear reactors that could burn plutonium more thoroughly.
"They're trying to improve on it by giving up on getting started
any time soon," said Matthew G. Bunn, a nuclear expert at the Kennedy
School of Government at Harvard, who was an adviser to the White House
Office of Science and Technology Policy in the Clinton administration.
He and other experts are skeptical that a new generation of reactors,
which was also mentioned in President Bush's energy plan as a way to
dispose of nuclear waste, would ever be built. Construction on the last
nuclear plants built in the United States country was begun more than
25 years ago.
"We're back at Square 1 with the program, and they're looking
at imaginary options, like advanced reactors," said Tom Clements,
executive director the Nuclear Control Institute, a nonprofit group
that opposes the use of plutonium for reactor fuel. "For financial
reasons, it's not going to be viable."
Though the administration is considering dropping the program to convert
or immobilize weapons- grade plutonium, a separate Russian-American
program to reduce the inventory of another Russian bomb fuel, highly
enriched uranium, is continuing. In fact, uranium that was intended
for Russian bombs now meets more than half the needs of American power
But diluting uranium to the type used in power plants is technically
far simpler and cheaper than the process required for plutonium, which
must be converted from the metal form used in weapons to a plutonium-uranium
ceramic used in American power plants.
In fact, enriched uranium has economic value as reactor fuel, while
converting plutonium appears to be a money-losing proposition.
Even so, Russian officials have said repeatedly that they view plutonium
as an asset and would like to build new breeder reactors, so named because
they produce plutonium faster than they consume the other main reactor
The end of the plutonium program would be mixed news for groups concerned
For example, the Nuclear Control Institute has pushed vigorously for
immobilization and against converting plutonium to reactor fuel, which
is known as mixed oxide, or MOx.
Officials of the institute say conversion to MOx is very expensive
and would encourage international commerce in weapons material.
"We think their assessment of MOx is correct,"
said Mr. Clements, referring to the administration. "The problem
is, it appears they've also rejected the cheaper alternative, which