Boxes
 Conflict
over the return of vitrified waste to Belgium
The first return of vitrified waste
to Belgium was carried out on April 4, 2000. However, the question
of quality control of the waste packages is causing a stir between
the nuclear establishment and the Belgian government. It is the State
Secretary of Energy, Olivier Deleuze, who asked to review the acceptance
procedures for wastes by the Belgian State and therefore the rules
applied to quality control. The Belgian government followed its minister
and declared on 3 March 2000, even before the arrival of the first
package, that "this reception does not commit the government
to the reception of the following packages." The decision
of the Council of Ministers defines the ensuing reception criteria
for wastes:
"The government will organize
the control of these wastes in two ways:
-Verification
of the conformity of the package to be received with the acceptance
criteria established by ONDRAF [the national radioactive waste management
agency](non-destructive analysis);
-A
physical check to determine the life expectancy of the various components
used (quality of the vitrification, cooling period, neutron dose
during the evacuation phase)–(destructive analysis on a sample).
Only
at the outcome of these inspections will the reception of the subsequent
packages be anticipated."
Applying
the governmental decision, Olivier Deleuze, on 6 July 2000, wrote
to ONDRAF, the national organism for the management of radioactive
wastes, asking it not to approve a second shipment for the time
being. At first, this led ONDRAF to correctly inform Synatom of
this by a letter of September 7, 2000 (Synatom has been given responsibility
by the Belgian electric companies for the execution of reprocessing
contracts with COGEMA). Meanwhile, research bodies were asked to
work on the development of a new quality control procedure. But
on 12 October 2000, in a spectacular turn of events, the State Secretary
of Energy announces in a press release
(The Belgian
Secretary of State for Energy accuses the nuclear lobby of 'sabotage
on the Government's decision') that "it now seems that
ONDRAF wishes in spite of everything to authorize this shipment,
thus opposing the controls decided by the government and thus reinforcing
Belgian society’s distrust of the nuclear lobby and its lack
of openness." And in stunning terms, Olivier Deleuze "notes
that the development of the radioactive waste control program is
systematically sabotaged by the nuclear lobby that perceives it
as unacceptable interference in its private hunting grounds."
The officials of other governments responsible for surveillance
of repatriated waste from COGEMA are attentively following the conflict
in Belgium...
Superphenix’s
setbacks continue...
Despite
the disastrous trajectory of Superphenix, the fast reactors option continues
to fascinate certain nostalgic characters who do not hesitate to talk
about "the path of fast neutrons and its promises", or of
"Superphenix: a symbol". Let us recall that Superphenix, according
to the "Cour des Comptes" [Government Accounting Office] will
have cost 60 billion francs when EDF (which replaced the European consortium
NERSA, dissolved Oct. 6, 2000, in its long term obligations) finishes
paying interest at the end of 2000. The plant continues to cost 800
million francs per year, including the expense of heating sodium in
order to keep it in a liquid form. It will also be necessary to spend
at least 17 billion francs to pump some 5,500 tons of highly flammable
sodium, to unload the 650 core assemblies (which will no doubt take
longer than the 18 months initially forecasted), and finally to tear
down the installation. Begun on Dec.1, 1999, the unloading in mid-October
2000 concerned the 67th assembly. Unloading had been suspended
for two months, pending a permit to continue, required because the amounts
of residual sodium on the assemblies were greater than foreseen.
In
these conditions, how can one justify the investment of 600 million
francs for "re-conditioning" of the predecessor Phenix whereas,
since May 29, 1998, the plant has been subject to three requests introduced
by the Forum Plutonium for cancellation of its restart permit?
These requests are based principally on insufficient safety criteria;
on Nov. 13, 1998, Phenix was prematurely stopped following a sodium
leak that passed the second confinement barrier...The affair awaits
judgment by the Administrative Court of Appeal in Paris to which it
was referred more than two years ago.
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UP1
begins its costly deconstruction
With
a total estimate by the Cour des Comptes (Accounting Court) of 37 to
40 billion francs (20 billion for the reconditioning of wastes and 17
to 20 billion for the actual dismantling), the Marcoule plant will,
over the next 30 years, and after 40 years of operation, be the object
of the first dismantling in France of a reprocessing plant. Let us recall
that the plant, put on line in 1958, has been used in succession (and
in parallel) for military applications and then for the reprocessing
of civilian UNGG fuels (Natural Uranium Graphite Gas), and that its
final shut-down was announced at the beginning of 1998, after the reprocessing
of over 18,200 tons of nuclear fuel from the CEA (for the Ministry of
defense), from EDF, and from other customers of COGEMA. The Codem GIE
(Groupement d’Interet Economique), created in July 1996 under the
triangular aegis of the CEA (45%), of EDF (45%) and of COGEMA (10%)
is responsible for controlling and financing the three phases: Mise
à l’Arret Définitif (MAD) [Permanent Shut-down],
Reprise et Conditionnement des Déchets (RCD) [Re-conditioning
of Wastes], and Démantèlement des installations jusqu’au
niveau 2 (DEM) [Dismantling to Level 2]. Provisions made by EDF and
COGEMA for the dismantling operations of UP1 went up from 4.6 billion
francs in 1992 to 16.7 billion francs in 1997.
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